

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 KINSHA 08026 01 OF 07 241639Z
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 ISO-00 HA-05 IO-13 ACDA-12 AID-05
EB-08 OMB-01 TRSE-00 DLOS-09 MMO-01 INRE-00
CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 EUR-12 MCE-00 L-03 H-01
DOE-15 SOE-02 DOEE-00 COME-00 SS-15 SP-02 NSCE-00
SSO-00 /130 W

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O 241546Z JUL 78

FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1048

INFO USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GER ECJ 4/7

JCS WASHDC

SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 7 KINSHASA 8026

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, MPOL, CG

SUBJECT: INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF US SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO ZAIRE FOR
FY 1980

REF: STATE 167901

1. ALL RESPONSES ARE KEYED TO REFTEL.

2. RE PARA 3A1. THE U.S. INTERESTS TO BE SERVED BY MAINTAINING A
SECURITY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP WITH ZAIRE ARE:

A) THE PRESERVATION OF ZAIRE'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND
POLITICAL STABILITY, THE FURTHER EROSION OF WHICH COULD CONTRIBUTE
TO AN EXTERNALLY INDUCED INTRA-AFRICAN CONFLICT AFFECTING ALL
OF CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN AFRICA.

B) THE MAINTENANCE OF ZAIRE'S ABILITY TO PLAY AN INFLUENTIAL,
MODERATE AND PRO-WESTERN ROLE IN AFRICAN AND GLOBAL CONTEXTS.

C) THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. INFLUENCE AMONG PRESENT AND FUTURE
ZAIRIAN LEADERS MANY OF WHOM CURRENTLY ARE OR HAVE BEEN MEMBERS
OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT.

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 KINSHA 08026 01 OF 07 241639Z

D) CONTINUED ACCESS TO ZAIRE'S EXTENSIVE MINERAL RESOURCES
AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE U.S. AND OTHER
FRIENDLY COUNTRIES.

E) THE RETENTION OF U.S. OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS AND ACCESS TO
ZAIRE'S AIRFIELDS AND PORTS FOR THE SUPPORT OF POSSIBLE U.S.
CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN AFRICA.

F) THE FURTHERING OF ZAIRIAN POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, ADMIN-

ISTRATIVE AND MILITARY REFORMS, WHICH ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THESE U.S. INTERESTS.

THE SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES OF U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE ARE:

(A) TO JOIN WITH OTHER WESTERN NATIONS TO HELP ZAIRE DEVELOP THE CAPABILITY TO RAISE AND MAINTAIN THE DISCIPLINED, WELL-EQUIPPED FORCE NECESSARY TO DEFEND THE COUNTRY'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND NATIONAL UNITY, AND (B) TO PROVIDE AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN A PROGRAM DESIGNED TO INDUCE THE GOZ TO INSTITUTE ESSENTIAL REFORMS.

3. RE PARA 3A2. GOZ OFFICIALS BELIEVE THE PRIMARY EXTERNAL THREAT TO ZAIRE LIES IN A "SOVIET DESIGN" TO GAIN A POSITION OF CONTROL AND INFLUENCE IN CENTRAL AFRICA, TO THE IMMEDIATE DETRIMENT OF THE WEST AND OF WESTERN-ORIENTED, POLITICALLY MODERATE NATIONS THROUGHOUT AFRICA. THE TWO INVASIONS OF THE ECONOMICALLY VITAL SHABAN COPPERBELT BY THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR CONGOLESE LIBERATION (FLNC) ARE VIEWED AS CUBAN/SOVIET SPONSORED ATTEMPTS TO FURTHER THIS DESIGN BY OVERTHROWING MOBUTU.

4. THE GOZ SEES THE SOVIETS AS BEING AIDED AND ABETTED BY NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES ESPOUSING SOCIALISM AND PROCLAIMING GOALS INCOMPATIBLE WITH ZAIRE'S OWN DESIDERATA FOR AFRICA'S FUTURE. IN PARTICULAR, ANGOLA'S MARXIST REGIME, ARMED WITH SOVIET-SUPPLIED WEAPONS AND SUPPORTED BY CUBAN "MERCENARIES", IS SEEN AS A DIRECT AND IMMEDIATE THREAT TO ZAIRE'S SECURITY. AGAIN, THE INVASIONS OF SHABA BY THE FLNC ARE CONSIDERED CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 KINSHA 08026 01 OF 07 241639Z

CONCLUSIVE PROOF OF LUANDA'S HOSTILE INTENTIONS.

5. WHILE RELATIONS WITH THE CONGO HAVE IMPROVED, AND MOST OF THE CUBAN TROOPS ONCE THERE ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE NOW DEPARTED, ZAIRE STILL CONSIDERS THE CONGO A POTENTIAL THREAT DUE TO ITS MARXIST ORIENTATION. THIS BELIEF IS SUPPORTED BY THE FACT THAT THE CONGOLESE BY THEIR PROXIMITY ARE IN A POSITION TO HARASS AND INTERDICT ZAIRE'S INTERNAL TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM LINKING THE CAPITAL AND THE REST OF THE COUNTRY.

6. IN THE EAST, THE MOST SERIOUS POTENTIAL THREAT IS SEEN AS COMING FROM UGANDA DUE TO ITS ERRATIC LEADERSHIP. BURUNDI AND TANZANIA ARE ALSO SUSPECT BECAUSE OF THEIR "PROGRESSIVE" POLITICAL ORIENTATION, THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET ARMS AND ADVISORS, AND THE RECENTLY OPENED CUBAN EMBASSY IN BURUNDI. TANZANIA IS ALSO BELIEVED TO SUPPORT THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY (PRP) AND OTHER ANTI-MOBUTU REGIME GROUPS IN EASTERN ZAIRE. TANZANIA COULD BECOME A CONDUIT FOR SOVIET/CUBAN AID TO SUCH GROUPS ACTING IN CONCERT WITH THE ANGOLA-BASED FLNC. IN THE WAKE OF THE SECOND SHABA WAR, ZAIRE ALSO PERCEIVES A MINOR THREAT FROM ZAMBIA, IN THAT IT MIGHT AGAIN INADVERTENTLY OR DELIBERATELY ALLOW DISSIDENT ELEMENTS TO PASS THROUGH ITS OWN TERRITORY

IN ORDER TO STRIKE AT ZAIRE.

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 01 KINSHA 08026 02 OF 07 241704Z
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 ISO-00 HA-05 IO-13 ACDA-12 AID-05
EB-08 OMB-01 TRSE-00 DLOS-09 MMO-01 INRE-00
CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 EUR-12 MCE-00 L-03 H-01
DOE-15 SOE-02 DOEE-00 COME-00 SS-15 SP-02 NSCE-00
SSO-00 /130 W

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O 241546Z JUL 78
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1049
INFO USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER ECJ 4/7
JCS WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 7 KINSHASA 8026

7. THE GOZ CONTINUES TO PERCEIVE AN INTERNAL THREAT FROM THE REMANTS OF THE VARIOUS REBEL MOVEMENTS OF THE EARLY 1960'S. THE MOST PERSISTENT OF THESE GROUPS, INCLUDING THE PRO, OPERATE IN THE MOUNTAINOUS REGION WEST OF LAKE TANGANYIKA, WHERE A SPECIAL FAZ (ZAIRIAN ARMY) COMMAND EXISTS TO DEAL WITH THEM. HOWEVER, THE VIOLENT INCIDENTS WHICH OCCURRED IN BANDUNDU REGION IN JANUARY AND FEBRUARY OF THIS YEAR, SUPPOSEDLY INSTIGATED BY ADHERENTS OF THE EXECUTED REBEL LEADER PIERRE MULELE, ARE CONSIDERED PROOF THAT THIS INTERNAL THREAT KNOWS NO GEOGRAPHIC LIMIT.

8. MOBUTU IS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A COUP D'ETAT BY DISSIDENT ARMY OFFICERS. AN ALLEGED COUP PLOT WAS REVEALED IN MARCH, 1978 FOR WHICH THIRTEEN OFFICERS WERE EXECUTED AND OTHERS DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE AND/OR JAILED. A SUBSEQUENT PURGE RESULTED IN WHOLESALE DISMISSALS OF OFFICERS WHO WERE CONSIDERED SUSPECT IN TERMS OF LOYALTY TO THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. INDIVIDUALS OF SHABAN OR KASAIAN ORIGIN WERE PARTICULAR TARGETS.

9. THE GOZ'S RESPONSE TO THESE EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL THREATS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 KINSHA 08026 02 OF 07 241704Z

IS BASED PRIMARILY UPON THE ACQUISITION AND MAINTENANCE OF AN ADEQUATE MILITARY DEFENSE/SECURITY STRUCTURE. CONCURRENTLY, DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL MEANS ARE USED TO MAINTAIN AND STRENGTHEN BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH ZAIRE'S IMMEDIATE NEIGHBORS AND "MODERATE" AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS. FINALLY, THE GOZ HAS SOUGHT THE WIDEST POSSIBLE POLITICAL, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT FROM FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS IN AFRICA AND AROUND THE WORLD. THIS SUPPORT IS CONSIDERED A KEY ELEMENT OF THE REGIME'S PLANS FOR MEETING THE EXTERNAL THREAT, AS WELL AS OF THE "MOBUTU PLAN" WHICH IS INTENDED INDIRECTLY TO DEFUSE THE INTERNAL THREAT BY MEETING THE ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT NEEDS OF ZAIRE.

10. RE PARA 3A3. THE MISSION BELIEVES THAT THE ANGOLAN/FLNC COMBINATION REPRESENTS THE MOST SERIOUS EXTERNAL THREAT TO ZAIRE. WHILE WE DO NOT NECESSARILY ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF AN OVERALL SOVIET "DESIGN", IT IS CERTAIN THAT THE USSR WILL ACT TO EXPLOIT ANY OPPORTUNE WEAKNESS OR INSTABILITY IN ZAIRE. FURTHERMORE, AS EVENTS OF THE PAST TWO YEARS HAVE SHOWN, ANGOLA'S GEOGRAPHIC POSITION PROVIDES EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR HOSTILE FORCES OPERATING FROM ANGOLAN TERRITORY TO INFLICT SERIOUS DAMAGE ON ZAIRE.

11. SO LONG AS ANGOLA IS PREOCCUPIED WITH SECURITY PROBLEMS FROM NAMIBIA/SOUTH AFRICAN AND FROM UNITA WITHIN, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT ANGOLA IS IN A POSITION TO MOUNT A DIRECT SUSTAINED MILITARY EFFORT AGAINST ZAIRE--DESPITE THE CONTINUED CUBAN/ SOVIET PRESENCE. THE ANGOLANS COULD OF COURSE CARRY OUT VERY DAMAGING CROSS-BORDER RAIDS ON ZAIRE'S INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND POPULATION CENTERS, OR THEY COULD SPONSOR IRREGULAR FORCES (I.E., THE FLNC) TO CARRY THE BURDEN OF SUCH HARASSMENT AND INTERDICTION RAIDS. CONSIDERING THE VULNERABILITY OF ZAIRE'S BORDERS AND THE FRAGILITY OF ITS ECONOMY, EVEN
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 KINSHA 08026 02 OF 07 241704Z

THIS TYPE OF LIMITED ATTACK COULD REPRESENT A MAJOR THREAT TO THE COUNTRY'S SECURITY. WHILE THERE ARE NOW SOME INDICATIONS THAT BORDER TENSIONS MAY DECREASE IN THE FUTURE (E.G., THE GDA PLEDGE TO DISARM FLNC IRREGULARS, CURRENT GOA-GOZ NEGOTIATIONS TO SET UP AN INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION ALONG THE FRONTIER), THE POTENTIAL THREAT TO ZAIRE FROM ANGOLA WILL REMAIN HIGH UNLESS AND UNTIL THE TWO COUNTRIES NORMALIZE RELATIONS AND THE LARGE CUBAN COMBAT TROOP PRESENCE IS REDUCED.

12. WHILE THERE WILL PROBABLY BE NO DIRECT MILITARY THREAT FROM ZAMBIA AS LONG AS PRESIDENT KAUNDA IS IN OFFICE AND THE ZIMBABWE QUESTION IS UNRESOLVED, HOSTILITIES IN ZIMBABWE COULD CUT VITAL TRADE ROUTES BETWEEN SHABA AND SOUTHERN AFRICA.

THE CONGO AND UGANDA ARE POTENTIAL THREATS BUT NEITHER PRESENTLY POSSESSES THE CAPABILITY OF MOUNTING ANYTHING MORE THAN A LIMITED CROSS-BORDER OPERATION OR A ONE-TIME STRIKE AT AN ECONOMIC PRESSURE POINT. (AS STATED ABOVE, HOWEVER, EVEN SUCH LIMITED OPERATIONS COULD HAVE A MAJOR IMPACT ON ZAIRE IN ITS PRESENT PRECARIOUS ECONOMIC CONDITION.) WE DO NOT SEE A THREAT AT PRESENT FROM ANY OTHER NEIGHBOR, EXCEPT FOR TANZANIA'S PROVEN ABILITY TO FURNISH AID AND SUPPORT TO ZAIRIAN REBELS (PRIMARILY THE PRP) OPERATING IN EASTERN ZAIRE.

13. THE WIDESPREAD POPULAR DISCONTENT WHICH EXISTS DOES NOT AT THIS TIME CONSTITUTE A THREAT TO THE EXISTENCE OF THE REGIME. THIS ANTI-PATHY HAS NOT MOVED THE POPULATION TO SUPPORT THE FLNC, PRP, OR ANY OTHER ALTERNATIVE TO THE MOBUTU GOVERNMENT, EVEN IN SHABA WHERE THESE GROUPS ARE SYMPATHETICALLY REGARDED. HOWEVER, CONTINUED ECONOMIC MISMANAGEMENT AND CORRUPTION; HEAVY-HANDED REPRESSION OF POCKETS OF DISSATISFACTION; IRRESPONSIBLE, INTIMIDATING BEHAVIOR OF THE ZAIRIAN ARMY AND GENDARMERIE; AND OTHER SOURCES OF POPULAR DISAFFECTION COULD -- IF NOT CHECKED -- SPARK A SHIFT IN POPULAR SUPPORT TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE REGIME. SUCH A SHIFT COULD RESULT IN WIDESPREAD VIOLENCE AND SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE INTERNAL SECURITY.

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 01 KINSHA 08026 03 OF 07 250629Z
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 ISO-00 HA-05 IO-13 ACDA-12 AID-05
EB-08 OMB-01 TRSE-00 DLOS-09 MMO-01 INRE-00
CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 EUR-12 MCE-00 L-03 H-01
DOE-15 SOE-02 DOEE-00 COME-00 SS-15 SP-02 NSCE-00
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FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1050

INFO USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GER ECJ 4/7

JCS WASHDC

SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 7 KINSHASA 8026

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (MRN 8026 VICE 8016)

14. ZAIRE'S LONG-TERM SECURITY AGAINST BOTH THE EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL THREATS WILL ULTIMATELY DEPEND UPON THE REGIME'S

ABILITY TO SATISFY THE PEOPLE'S WANTS AND NEEDS. THIS IS IN TURN DEPENDENT UPON THE GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO INSTITUTE BADLY NEEDED REFORMS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMIC SECTOR.

15. CERTAINLY ZAIRE MUST ALSO BE ABLE TO PROTECT ITS RESOURCES, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND INDUSTRIAL PLANT WHILE IMPLEMENTING REFORMS. ZAIRE'S HISTORY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISORDER AND SECTIONALISM SHOWS THE NEED FOR A STRONG CENTRAL AUTHORITY. HOWEVER, A BALANCE NEEDS TO BE STRUCK BETWEEN THE NEED FOR THIS PROTECTIVE CAPACITY AND THE FOCUSING OF RESOURCES UPON NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. THEREFORE, THE USG SHOULD SEEK TO IDENTIFY AND ENCOURAGE WAYS BY WHICH THE NECESSARY MILITARY FORCE CAN BE BROUGHT INTO BEING WITHOUT DETRACTING FROM NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND IDEALLY WHILE CONTRIBUTING TO THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS.

16. RE PARA 3A4. ACCORDING TO CURRENT GOZ PLANNING, THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 KINSHA 08026 03 OF 07 250629Z

REORGANIZED FAZ WILL BE MADE UP PRIMARILY OF BRIGADE-SIZE UNITS. EIGHT OF THESE WILL BE MOBILE LIGHT INFANTRY FORCES GARRISONED AROUND THE COUNTRY. AN AIRBORNE BRIGADE OF THREE BATTALIONS IS BEING FORMED TO SERVE AS A QUICK REACTION FORCE. RECENT REPORTS HAVE INDICATED THAT FAZ'S EXISTING ANTI-TANK PLATOON, EQUIPPED WITH FRENCH ENTAC ANTI-TANK MISSILES, WILL BE ATTACHED TO THIS BRIGADE. ALSO PLANNED IS AN ARMORED BRIGADE TO BE EQUIPPED WITH THE AVAILABLE PANHARD ARMORED CARS AND PRC-SUPPLIED TANKS. THE GOZ HAS APPROXIMATELY THIRTY-NINE TYPE 62 LIGHT TANKS ON HAND AND RECENTLY RECEIVED TWENTY-NINE MORE TANKS OF UNKNOWN TYPE FROM THE PRC.

17. HOWEVER, AS THIS TOTAL FORCE WILL REQUIRE SEVERAL YEARS TO DEVELOP, THE INITIAL FOCUS WILL BE ON THE ACCELERATED TRAINING OF THE THREE PARA BATTALIONS BY THE FRENCH, WITH A TARGET COMPLETION DATE OF APRIL 1979. THE BELGIANS PLAN TO TRAIN ONE LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE PER YEAR, WITH THREE BRIGADES TO BE FORMED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BY BLENDING NEW RECRUITS WITH THE EXISTING POORLY-TRAINED AND UNDERSTRENGTH BRIGADES.

18. A COASTAL DEFENSE/RIVERINE NAVY WILL BE DEVELOPED AROUND THE FOUR PRC-SUPPLIED SHANGHAI II GUNBOATS, THE US SWIFT BOATS, AND OTHER SMALL PATROL CRAFT OF VARIED ORGINS. (THE THREE NORTH KOREAN-SUPPLIED SIN HUNG PATROL BOATS HAVE APPARENTLY BROKEN DOWN BEYOND REPAIR WITHOUT ADDITIONAL KOREAN ASSISTANCE.) THIS FORCE WILL DEFEND THE MOUTH AND COASTAL LENGTH OF THE ZAIRE RIVER AND PATROL LAKE TANGANYIKA, AS WELL AS PROVIDE COAST GUARD TYPE NAVIGATION ASSISTANCE ALONG THE INLAND RIVER ROUTES. REPORTED GOZ PLANS TO RAISE A MARINE BRIGADE (WITH FRENCH ASSISTANCE) TO BE BASED AT KALEMIE ON LAKE TANGANYIKA, APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN AT LEAST TEMPORARILY SHELVED.

19. THE GOZ BELIEVES THAT ITS CURRENT AIR FORCE (FAZA)

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 KINSHA 08026 03 OF 07 250629Z

STRUCTURE IS CAPABLE OF PROVIDING THE NEEDED LIMITED RECONNAISSANCE, CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, AND AIR TRANSPORTATION FOR THE AIRBORNE BRIGADE AND THE NEW LOGISTICAL CORPS. FAZA'S STRENGTH STANDS AS FOLLOWS: ONE FIGHTER SQUADRON OF FOURTEEN MIRAGES (AIR SUPPORT AND RECONNAISSANCE); ONE FIGHTER SQUADRON OF THREE MACCHIS; A TRANSPORT SQUADRON OF SIX C-130'S, TWO BUFFALOS, AND SEVEN CESSNA 310'S; A TRAINING SQUADRON INCLUDING FIFTEEN CESSNA 150'S; AND A HELICOPTER UNIT OF ONE ALOUETTE III, ONE PUMA, AND ONE SUPER FRELON (MOBUTU'S PRIVATE HELICOPTER). FAZA HOPES EVENTUALLY TO ACQUIRE SIX NEW C-130'S, EIGHT TO TEN ADDITIONAL CESSNA 310'S, AND MORE HELICOPTERS.

20. THE NEW LOGISTICAL CORPS, WHICH WILL PROVIDE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR ALL OF THE BRANCHES OF FAZ, IS STILL IN THE INFANT STAGE. IT WILL EVENTUALLY HAVE SOME FOUR THOUSAND MEN, WITH A SUPPORT BATTALION FOR EACH INFANTRY BRIGADE. THE GOZ ALSO HAS PLANS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMMAND CENTER WHICH WOULD CENTRALIZE THE CONTROL OF ALL ELEMENTS OF THE ZAIRIAN ARMED FORCES.

21. RE PARA 3A5. THE POOR PERFORMANCE OF MOST FAZ ELEMENTS, EXCEPT THE AIRBORNE, IN SHABA'S I AND II CONFIRMED THAT THE ZAIRIAN MILITARY FORCES AS PRESENTLY CONSTITUTED ARE CAPABLE. OF NOTHING MORE THAN CONTAINING LOCAL DISORDERS AND BANDITRY AND DEFENDING AGAINST SMALL-SCALE BORDER RAIDS WITH IN-PLACE FORCES. AS INDICATED BY THIS PERFORMANCE, FAZ'S MOST IMMEDIATE NEEDS ARE FOR INDIVIDUAL AND UNIT TRAINING; LEADERSHIP, ESPECIALLY AT THE PLATOON AND COMPANY LEVELS; A REORGANIZATION OF THE EXISTING COMMAND STRUCTURE TO ALLOW FOR FAZ'S SHORTAGE OF MANAGERIAL SKILLS AND TECHNICIANS, AND IMPROVED MORALE.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 KINSHA 08026 04 OF 07 250631Z

ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 ISO-00 HA-05 IO-13 ACDA-12 AID-05

EB-08 OMB-01 TRSE-00 DLOS-09 MMO-01 INRE-00

CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 EUR-12 MCE-00 L-03 H-01

DOE-15 SOE-02 DOEE-00 COME-00 SS-15 SP-02 NSCE-00

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O 241546Z JUL 78

FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1051

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JCS WASHDC

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 7 KINSHASA 8026

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (MRN 8026 VICE 8016)

22. THE BELGIANS AND FRENCH HAVE UNDERTAKEN TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY TRAINING FOR THE INFANTRY AND PARATROOPS, RESPECTIVELY. TO DATE, WE HAVE PROPOSED ONLY THAT WE PROVIDE TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT FOR THE LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADES IN OUR TRADITIONAL AREAS OF TRANSPORT, COMMUNICATIONS, AND LOGISTICS. WITH THIS AID THE GOZ'S PLANS FOR FAZ REORGANIZATION ARE REALISTIC AND APPROPRIATE TO THE SITUATION. THE ALTERNATIVE IS TO ALLOW FAZ TO CONTINUE AS IT HAS, THUS INCREASING THE REGIME'S VULNERABILITY TO BEING OVERTHROWN BY THE FLNC OR BY OTHER ELEMENTS NOT NOW IDENTIFIABLE.

23. RE PARA 3A6. AS A PERCENTAGE OF BOTH OVERALL GOVERNMENT AND GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENTAL DEFENSE SPENDING REMAINS LOW. IN 1977 (THE LAST YEAR FOR WHICH FIGURES ARE AVAILABLE) ONLY Z 67 MILLION WERE BUDGETED FOR CURRENT MILITARY EXPENDITURES (INCLUDING THE GENDARMERIE). ABOUT 60 PER CENT OF THIS WAS NOMINALLY EARMARKED FOR SALARIES. IN 1975, 76, AND 77 BUDGETED DEFENSE SPENDING WAS RESPECTIVELY, 9.0, 9.8, CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 KINSHA 08026 04 OF 07 250631Z

AND 9.1 PER CENT OF THE TOTAL BUDGET. ACTUAL SPENDING FOR THE SAME YEARS REPRESENTED 11.8, 7.8, AND 9.6 PER CENT OF TOTAL EXPENDITURES. BREAKDOWNS OF THE MILITARY VERSUS CIVILIAN DEBT SERVICE ARE AVAILABLE ONLY FOR THE 1977 BUDGET YEAR, BUT IN THAT CASE MILITARY DEBT SERVICE WAS SET AT Z 35.3 MILLION, OR 14.2 PER CENT OF TOTAL DEBT SERVICE DUE. AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP, ANNUAL MILITARY SPENDING (NOT INCLUDING DEBT SERVICE) HAS VARIED FROM 2.5 TO 3.5 PERCENT.

24. DESPITE THE SMALL RELATIVE SIZE OF DEFENSE DEBT SERVICE REQUIREMENTS, THE MILITARY HAS FARED NO BETTER THAN THE REST OF THE ECONOMY IN OBTAINING SUFFICIENT FOREIGN EXCHANGE TO MEET ITS DEBT SERVICE COMMITMENTS. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE FRENCH MIRAGE CONTRACT (EQUALING ONE-THIRD OF MILITARY DEBT SERVICE), WHICH APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN PAID WITH SOME REGULARITY, ALL OTHER CREDITORS HAVE EXPERIENCED DELAYS AND TECHNICAL

DEFAULTS ON PAYMENTS DUE THEM. THE U.S. EXPERIENCE IN THIS AREA IS TYPICAL, AND IS LIKELY TO REMAIN SO FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. UNTIL ZAIRE'S OVERALL FINANCIAL SITUATION STABILIZES AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE BECOMES MORE AVAILABLE AND BETTER MANAGED, MILITARY DEBT SERVICE WILL CONTINUE TO BE SOMEWHAT HAPHAZARD AND DEPENDENT UPON THE ATTENTION AND WHIMS OF HIGH LEVEL POLITICIANS. FIGURES ON MILITARY IMPORTS AS A PORTION OF TOTAL IMPORTS ARE NOT AVAILABLE.

25. RE PARA 3A7. SEE MSAP SUBMISSION FOR ZAIRE FOR FYS 80-84.

26. RE PARA 3A8. NO RESPONSE NECESSARY PER STATE 182987.

27. RE PARA 3A9. NO RESPONSE NECESSARY PER STATE 182987.

28. RE PARA 3A10. ALL PROPOSED SALES OF EQUIPMENT RELATE STRICTLY TO TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT OR TO THE SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE OF PREVIOUSLY ACQUIRED EQUIPMENT REPRESENTING NO CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 KINSHA 08026 04 OF 07 250631Z

NEW CAPABILITY. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT ARMS CONTROL IMPACT FROM THE PROPOSED SALES.

29. RE PARA 3A11. EFFORTS TO IMPROVE HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS IN ZAIRE HAVE HAD MIXED AND, OVER-ALL, NOT VERY ENCOURAGING RESULTS DURING THE PAST YEAR. DESPITE PRESIDENT MOBUTU'S PLEDGE IN HIS JULY 1, 1977, SPEECH TO CURTAIL INJUSTICES COMMITTED AGAINST THE PEOPLE BY THE GENDARMERIE AND ARMY, THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE PROGRESS TO DATE IN STRENGTHENING TROOP DISCIPLINE AND COMMAND/CONTROL. THIS WAS CLEARLY EVIDENCED BY FAZ'S SUMMARY EXECUTION OF 14 "REBELS" AT IDIOFA IN JANUARY, BY THE WIDESPREAD INCIDENTS OF FAZ PILLAGING AND MISTREATMENT OF CIVILIANS DURING AND SINCE THIS YEAR'S SHABA INVASION, AND BY THE GENDARMERIE'S CONTINUED HARASSMENT OF CIVILIANS IN KINSHASA AND ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY. OTHER DISCOURAGING DEVELOPMENTS HAVE BEEN THE IMPRISONMENT OF FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER NGUZA ON FLIMSY EVIDENCE OF TREASON; THE TRIAL AND CONVICTION FOR ALLEGED COUP PLOTTING OF A LARGE NUMBER OF MILITARY OFFICERS AND CIVILIAN ACCOMPLICES, 13 OF WHOM WERE EXECUTED IN APRIL; THE POST-TRIAL PURGE FROM FAZ RANKS OF LARGE NUMBERS OF OFFICERS; AND THE ROUND-UP AND DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL IN JUNE OF AS MANY AS 1,00 CIVILIANS IN SHABA FOR REASONS OF "STATE SECURITY".

30. ON THE MORE POSITIVE SIDE OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS LEGER, OUR REPEATED DEMARCHES AND RELATED ACTIONS HAVE SERVED TO MAKE MOBUTU ACUTELY AWARE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS ELEMENT IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS AND, WE BELIEVE, HAVE BEEN A MAJOR FACTOR IN

HIS TAKING WHAT STEPS HE HAS IN THIS AREA. RECENTLY, THESE HAVE INCLUDED A PUBLIC PLEDGE TO TAKE MORE STRINGENT MEASURES AGAINST THE GENDARMERIE FOR MISTREATMENT OF CIVILIANS; FORMULATION OF NEW PLANS FOR THE ACCELERATED REORGANIZATION AND TRAINING OF FAZ; THE REPORTED

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 KINSHA 08026 04 OF 07 250631Z

REINSTATEMENT OF MANY FAZ OFFICERS PURGED FOLLOWING APRIL'S COUP-PLOT TRAIL; AND THE RELEASE FROM PRISON OF NGUZA, AFTER SERVING LESS THAN ONE YEAR OF HIS LIFE SENTENCE, AS PART OF AN OVER-ALL AMNESTY OF CIVILIANS (BUT NOT MILITARY) DETAINED FOR POLITICAL CRIMES.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 KINSHA 08026 241854Z
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 ISO-00 HA-05 IO-13 ACDA-12 AID-05
EB-08 OMB-01 TRSE-00 DLOS-09 MMO-01 INRE-00
CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 EUR-12 MCE-00 L-03 H-01
DOE-15 SOE-02 DOEE-00 COME-00 SS-15 SP-02 NSCE-00
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O 241546Z JUL 78

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1052

INFO USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER ECJ4/7

JCS WASHDC

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 5 OF 7 KINSHASA 8026

31. IN OUR ASSESSMENT OF THIS MIXED PICTURE, IT IS EVIDENT THAT A CONTINUING PROBLEM IS THE GOVERNMENT'S FREQUENT FAILURE TO FOLLOW UP DECISIONS WITH EFFECTIVE ACTION -- DUE TO EITHER TO ADMINISTRATIVE WEAKNESSES IN IMPLEMENTING ORDERS, OR TO LACK OF WILL AND DETERMINED LEADERSHIP AT THE TOP, OR - AS SEEMS MOST LIKELY - TO BOTH. CERTAINLY THE HOPE (AS EXPRESSED IN OUR ASSESSMENT LAST YEAR) THAT US MILITARY ASSISTANCE MIGHT ACTUALLY PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS BY CONTRIBUTING TO A BETTER PROVISIONED AND DISCIPLINED FORCE, WHICH

WOULD THEREFORE BE LESS INCLINED TOWARD EXTORTION AMONG CIVILIANS, HAS YET TO BE REALIZED. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE CAN NOT RPT NOT CONCLUDE THAT OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE, LIMITED AS IT IS TO BASIC, NON-LETHAL ITEMS SUCH AS TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATIONS AND TRAINING, HAS ACTUALLY CONTRIBUTED TO HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. CONCEIVABLY ONE COULD QUESTION EVEN THIS LIMITED ASSISTANCE ON THE GROUNDS THAT, PER PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE NO. 30, IT HELPS SUPPORT FAZ AND INDIRECTLY THE GENDARMERIE (WHICH IS PARTIALLY MERGED WITH FAZ AND SHARES COMMAND PERSONNEL AND RESOURCES) BOTH OF WHICH HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS SUCH AS SHABA PILLAGING AND THE IDIOFA

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 KINSHA 08026 241854Z

EXECUTIONS. HOWEVER, THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE MEASURES AGAINST THE URGENT NEEDS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE AND FOR MAINTENANCE OF CIVIL ORDER IN A COUNTRY WHICH IS BESET BY TRIBAL, ETHNIC AND OTHER FORCES DEBILITATING TO NATIONAL UNITY. MOREOVER, WE MUST BEAR IN MIND THAT THE EXISTENCE OF OUR MILITARY AS WELL AS ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS PROVIDES US WITH MUCH OF WHAT LEVERAGE WE DO HAVE IN OUR CONTINUING EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE HUMAN RIGHTS AND OTHER NEEDED REFORMS. IT IS AFTER REVIEWING THESE MULTIPLE CONSIDERATIONS AND OBJECTIVES THAT WE CONCLUDE WITH A RECOMMENDATION TO CONTINUE THE PRESENT LEVEL OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR THE NEXT FISCAL YEAR, WITH SUBSEQUENT LEVELS CLOSELY RELATED TO AND DEPENDENT ON THE GOZ'Z PERFORMANCE IN IMPLEMENTING REFORMS AS WELL AS DEVELOPMENTS IN ANGOLA (SEE PARA 45 BELOW).

32. RE PARA 3A12. BELGIUM HAS 84 PERSONNEL IN COUNTRY IN A TRAINING AND ADVISORY CAPACITY, WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR BASIC OFFICER TRAINING, STAFF COLLEGE TRAINING, LOGISTICAL GUIDANCE, AND THE TRAINING OF THE NEW LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADES. THERE ARE SOME 90-100 FRENCH ADVISORY AND ASSISTANCE PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN AIRBORNE TRAINING,

MIRAGE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT SUPPORT AND TRAINING, PANHARD ARMORED CAR SUPPORT AND TRAINING, AND STAFF ASSISTANCE AT THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA HAS PROVIDED PAST MATERIAL ASSISTANCE IN THE FORM OF T-62 TANKS, TRUCKS, ARTILLERY, ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS, SHANGHAI II GUNBOATS, AND RECENTLY DELIVERED TWO MORE GUNBOATS AND TWENTY-NINE ADDITIONAL TANKS. IN ADDITION, THEY HAVE THIS YEAR PROVIDED PLA ADVISORY DETACHMENTS TO TRAIN ZAIRIAN NAVAL AND ARTILLERY PERSONNEL. EGYPT RECENTLY PROVIDED SIX 122MM ARTILLERY PIECES, AMMUNITION, AND AN EIGHT-MAN TEAM TO TRAIN ZAIRIAN GUN CREWS. THE NORTH KOREANS HAD SUPPLIED THREE SIN HUNG PATROL CRAFT IN 1974; HOWEVER, THESE ARE NO LONGER OPERATIONAL AND IT IS NOT EXPECTED THAT ANY FURTHER AID WILL BE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 KINSHA 08026 241854Z

FORTHCOMING FROM PYONGYANG.

33. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO ZAIRE COMES MAINLY FROM THE U.S.,
WESTERN EUROPE AND JAPAN. BECAUSE OF ZAIRE'S FINANCIAL CRISIS,
THESE DONORS HAVE ATTEMPTED TO WORK THROUGH AND WITH THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND AND THE WORLD BANK TO PROVIDE A BALANCED AND CONTROLLED

AID FLOW TO ZAIRE WHICH WOULD MEET ITS MOST IMMEDIATE NEEDS. IN
ADDITION, THE PRC, ROMANIA AND POLAND PROVIDE LIMITED ASSISTANCE TO
ZAIRE IN THE FORM OF FOOD AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
(TEACHERS, MEDICAL PERSONNEL, ETC.)

34. BY THE FAR THE LARGEST SINGLE DONOR TO ZAIRE IS BELGIUM, FOLLOWED
BY THE OTHER FREE WORLD POWERS. BELGIUM IS THE ONLY DONOR PRESENTLY
INCLINED TO PROVIDE ZAIRE WITH UNTIED LOANS FOR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
PURPOSES, AND EVEN THESE HAVE COME IN THE CONTEXT OF AGREEMENTS WITH
BELGIAN COMMERCIAL BANKS TO PROVIDE CREDIT TO FINANCE CERTAIN TYPES
OF IMPORTS. CREDIT FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT HAS GENERALLY BEEN
AVAILABLE ONLY FROM THE SELLER, ALTHOUGH IT IS ASSUMED THAT
SHABA I. MOST OF THE DONOR GOVERNMENTS HAVE CONCENTRATED THEIR
ASSISTANCE IN THE AGRICULTURAL AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENT FIELDS, OR
PROVIDED INVESTMENT AND EXPORT GUARANTEES FOR THEIR OWN FIRMS TO
ENCOURAGE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT IN ZAIRE.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 KINSHA 08026 06 OF 07 241824Z
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 ISO-00 HA-05 IO-13 ACDA-12 AID-05
EB-08 OMB-01 TRSE-00 DLOS-09 MMO-01 INRE-00
CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 EUR-12 MCE-00 L-03 H-01
DOE-15 SOE-02 DOEE-00 COME-00 SS-15 SP-02 NSCE-00
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FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

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INFO USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER ECJ 4/7

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 6 OF 7 KINSHASA 8026

35. RE PARA 3A13A. LEVEL 1 (MINIMUM LEVEL):

FY 80 FY 81 FY 82

FMSCR \$10.5 MILLION \$10.5 MILLION \$10.5 MILLION

IMET 2.0 MILLION 2.0 MILLION 2.0 MILLION

LEVEL ONE PROVIDES FOR OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE (O&M) SUPPORT FOR THE ZAIRIAN AIR FORCE'S (FAZA) C-130 AND CESSNA AIRCRAFT AND THE NAVY'S SWIFT BOATS, AND MINIMUM SPARE PARTS SUPPORT FOR U.S.-ORIGIN VEHICLES AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT CURRENTLY IN THE ZAIRIAN INVENTORY OR ON ORDER. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS O&M SUPPORT, WHICH IS A NECESSARY EXCEPTION TO POLICY DUE TO ZAIRE'S BLEAK ECONOMIC PICTURE, WOULD RESULT IN A GRADUAL DETERIORATION OF THE AIR FORCE'S TRANSPORT FLEET AND THE PROBABLE GROUNDING OF MOST OF ITS C-130 AND CESSNA AIRCRAFT WITHIN SIX TO NINE MONTHS AFTER THE END OF THE PROGRAM. THUS, THE SUPPORT IS ESSENTIAL TO GOZ SECURITY. THE NAVY AND ARMY WOULD ALSO SUFFER A REDUCTION IN THEIR ABILITY TO FULFILL THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES AS A RESULT OF VEHICLE AND EQUIPMENT FAILURES DUE TO THE LACK OF SPARE PARTS.

36. THE IMET PROGRAM INCLUDES TWO ARMY AND/OR AIR FORCE COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE SLOTS PER YEAR FOR MAJORS AND LIEUTENANT-COLONELS,
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 KINSHA 08026 06 OF 07 241824Z

PLUS APPROXIMATELY 100 SLOTS FOR BASIC AND ADVANCED TRAINING IN OPERATIONAL, LOGISTICAL AND MAINTENANCE MANGEMENT, AND LEADERSHIP POSITIONS FOR LIEUTENANTS AND CAPTAINS; AND A SUFFICIENT LEVEL OF TACTICAL QUALIFICATION TRAINING TO PRODUCE FOUR C-130 CREWS (16 POSITIONS) BY 1982. THIS NOT ONLY PROVIDES BASIC TRAINING, BUT STUDENTS ARE OFTEN RETURNED TO THE U.S. AFTER 2-3 YEARS FOR ADVANCED COURSES IN THEIR SPECIALITIES. THIS LEVEL OF PROGRAMMING WILL EXPOSE THE MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE NUMBER OF FAZ OFFICERS TO U.S. VALUES, DEMOCRATIC IDEALS, TO U.S. MILITARY MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL PRACTICES, THUS ASSISTING IN THE REFORM OF THE ZAIRIAN MILITARY AND THE REDUCTION OF CORRUPTION AND INEFFICIENCY.

37 EXCEPT FOR THE POSSIBLE REDUCTION OF CORRUPTION AND INEFFICIENCY WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES, AND USE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE AS PART OF OUR LEVERAGE TO INDUCE OVER-ALL REFORM, NEITHER THE FMSCR NOR IMET WILL HAVE A MAJOR EFFECT UPON THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN ZAIRE.

38. RE PARA 3A13B. LEVEL 2 (INTERMEDIATE LEVEL):

FY 80 FY 81 FY 82

FMSCR \$14.0 MILLION \$14.0 MILLION \$14.0 MILLION

IMET 2.0 MILLION 2.0 MILLION 2.0 MILLION

LEVEL TWO PROVIDES THE O&M SUPPORT OUTLINED UNDER LEVEL ONE, THE SAME LEVEL OF TRAINING UNDER IMET, AND ENABLES FAZ TO REPLACE LIMITED NUMBERS AND AMOUNTS OF ITS U.S. ORIGIN VEHICLES AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT. THIS LEVEL OF AID WOULD INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PLANNED LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADES BY PROVIDING

FOR MINIMUM TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT FOR THESE UNITS. WITHOUT THESE NEW FORMATIONS THE REGIME WILL BE UNABLE TO COPE WITH EITHER THE INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL THREATS FACING IT WITHOUT THE SUPPORT OF FOREIGN TROOPS.

39. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THESE NEW FORMATIONS COULD HAVE A POSITIVE, IF LIMITED, IMPACT ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION BY REDUCING ABUSES
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 KINSHA 08026 06 OF 07 241824Z

RESULTING FROM POOR TRAINING AND LACK OF DISCIPLINE. THE TRAINING OF JUNIOR ZAIRIAN OFFICERS IS AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE SUCCESS OF THESE NEW BRIGADES. WITHOUT THE IMPROVED SUPPORT WHICH THESE OFFICERS SHOULD BE ABLE TO PROVIDE IN THE AREAS OF PAY AND RATIONS, THESE NEW FORMATIONS WILL EVENTUALLY FALL INTO THE SAME PRACTICES AND ABUSES WHICH RENDERED THE EXISTING UNITS INEFFECTIVE.

40. RE PARA 3A13C. LEVEL THREE (CURRENT LEVEL):

FY 80 FY 81 FY 82

FMSCR \$17.7 MILLION \$15.8 MILLION \$14.4 MILLION

IMET 2.0 MILLION 2.0 MILLION 2.0 MILLION

THIS LEVEL OF ASSISTANCE ENCOMPASSES ALL OF THE O&M ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING SUPPORTED UNDER LEVELS ONE AND TWO, A FULL COMPLEMENT OF VEHICLES AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT FOR THE LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADES, AND THE TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT (FY 80 ONLY) NECESSARY FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMMAND CENTER. THE CENTER WOULD REPLACE THE PRESENT PATCHWORK SYSTEM AND MAKE MORE EFFICIENT USE OF FAZ'S LIMITED MANAGERIAL AND TECHNICAL TALENT.

41. THIS LEVEL OF ASSISTANCE REPRESENTS A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE FULFILLMENT OF FAZ'S REORGANIZATION PLANS. THE IMPROVED LOGISTICAL EFFICIENCY IMPLIED BY THE COMMAND CENTER COULD GO FAR TO REDUCE THOSE ABUSES OF HUMAN RIGHTS RESULTING FROM POOR LEADERSHIP

,
LACK OF TRAINING, AND INEFFICIENCY IN THE PROVISION OF PAY AND RATIONS WITHIN FAZ.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 KINSHA 08026 07 OF 07 241855Z

ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 ISO-00 HA-05 IO-13 ACDA-12 AID-05
EB-08 OMB-01 TRSE-00 DLOS-09 MMO-01 INRE-00
CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 EUR-12 MCE-00 L-03 H-01
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1054

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JCS WASHDC

SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 7 OF 7 KINSHASA 8026

42. RE PARA 3A13F. THE CURRENT AUTHORIZATION MANNING LEVEL FOR THE ZAIRIAN-AMERICAN MILITARY MISSION IS SIX MILITARY SPACES; ONE GS-7; AND THREE LOCAL HIRE EMPLOYEES (RECEPTIONIST/TRANSLATOR, FINANCE/BUDGET TECHNICIAN, AND ONE DRIVER). THE CURRENT LEVEL OF SIX MILITARY SPACES IS FELT TO BE THE ABSOLUTE MINIMUM NECESSARY FOR MANAGEMENT OF THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AT LEVELS 1, 2 AND 3. THE CURRENT SCARCITY OF MANAGEMENT SKILLS IN FAZ REQUIRES MISSION PERSONNEL TO ASSUME MOST OF THE PROGRAM MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS USUALLY PERFORMED BY THE HOST GOVERNMENT. POOR COMMUNICATIONS,

DISTANCE BETWEEN OFFICES, AND LACK OF COORDINATION AMONG FAZ AGENCIES MAKE FREQUENT VISITS AND FACE-TO-FACE CONTACT NECESSARY. THIS INCLUDES SEARCHING OUT FMS PAPERWORK AND SHIPMENTS THAT OTHERWISE TEND TO BECOME LOST, AND ESCORTING OUTBOUND IMET STUDENTS THROUGH PROCESSING AND DEPARTURE FOR CONUS TRAINING. FURTHERMORE, THE ISOLATED DUTY LOCATIONS MAKES INDIVIDUAL LEAVE ESSENTIAL AND 180 MILITARY MAN-DAYS PER YEAR MUST BE ALLOCATED FOR THIS PURPOSE.

43. RE PARA 3A13H. FOLLOWING ARE THE BEST ESTIMATES AVAILABLE AS TO THE EXPECTED NUMBER OF STUDENTS TO BE TRAINED AND THE SPECIFIC CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 KINSHA 08026 07 OF 07 241855Z

TYPES OF TRAINING ENVISAGED FOR THE MET PROGRAM FOR FYS 80, 81 AND 82 (ALL TRAINING IS TO TAKE PLACE IN THE U.S. AND AS THERE ARE NO SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS WORTHY OF THE NAME IN ZAIRE): TWO SLOTS FOR ARMY AND AIR FORCE COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE TRAINING FOR MAJORS OR LT. COLONELS; APPROXIMATELY 100 SLOTS FOR BASIC AND ADVANCED TRAINING IN OPERATIONAL, LOGISTICAL AND MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT, AND LEADERSHIP POSITIONS FOR LIEUTENANTS AND CAPTAINS, AND FOR A SUFFICIENT LEVEL OF TACTICAL QUALIFICATION TRAINING TO PRODUCE FOUR C-130 AIRCREWS (16 MEN TOTAL) BY 1982.

44. RE PARA 3A13I. IN COORDINATION WITH OTHER MAJOR DONOR NATIONS,

THE US IS INSISTING ON FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, ADMINISTRATIVE AND MILITARY REFORMS, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF WHICH WILL BE A MAJOR FACTOR IN DETERMINING OUR FUTURE AID LEVELS. TO ABOLISH OR ABRUPTLY AND SEVERELY REDUCE OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM TO ZAIRE WOULD WEAKEN THE LEVERAGE WE CAN EXERT ON THE GOZ TO INSTITUTE THESE REFORMS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE SHOULD IN THE FUTURE CONSIDER WITHHOLDING OR GRADUALLY REDUCING MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN RESPONSE TO POSSIBLE FAILURE OF THE GOZ'S REFORM EFFORTS.

45. NO MAJOR INCREASE IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE IS CALLED FOR AT THIS TIME. BELGIUM AND FRANCE HAVE AGREED TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY TRAINING FOR THE LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADES AND PARACHUTE BATTALIONS WHICH ARE THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS IN THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE ZAIRIAN ARMED FORCES. THE US SHOULD SUPPORT THIS PROGRAM AS ESSENTIAL FOR ZAIRE'S MINIMUM DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS AND AS A MEANS OF RETAINING OUR LEVERAGE WITH THE GOZ; BUT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO LIMIT OUR SUPPORT ESSENTIALLY TO TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT IN OUR TRADITIONAL AREAS OF TRANSPORT, COMMUNICATIONS AND LOGISTICS. SPECIFICALLY, THE AMBASSADOR PROPOSES THAT U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO ZAIRE PROCEED IN ACCORDANCE WITH LEVEL 3 AS PROJECTED IN PARA 40 ABOVE; I.E.,
FY 80: \$17.7 MILLION FMSCR, \$2 MILLION IMET; FYI 81: \$15.8 MILLION

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PAGE 03 KINSHA 08026 07 OF 07 241855Z

FMSCR, \$2 MILLION IMET; FY 82: \$15.4 MILLION FMSCR, \$2 MILLION IMET. HOWEVER, STARTING IN FY 80, THE LEVEL OF OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE CAREFULLY REVIEWED AND IF NECESSARY ADJUSTED DOWNWARD IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR ASSESSMENT OF (A) GOZ PERFORMANCE IN IMPLEMENTING REFORMS, INCLUDING MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE IMF STANDBY AGREEMENT; AND (B) PROGRESS TOWARD REDUCING SECURITY TENSIONS IN THE AREA, NOTABLY THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN ZAIRE AND ANGOLA.
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